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6The Ukraine Crisis has changed European and US 
security policy. Irrespective of the impact the crisis will 
have in the short, medium and long term, the Russian 
intervention in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and 
the subsequent destabilisation of eastern Ukraine will 
have far-reaching consequences for the following three 
reasons:
•	 It	will	reduce	strategic	warning	due	to	Russia’s	will	
and ability to use armed force in its neighbouring 
area. 
•	 It	is	apparently	the	definitive	Russian	departure	from	
the idea of a united, free Europe that began with the 
Helsinki Process and was realised with the integration 
of economies and societies after the end of the Cold 
War. An important element in the idea of a united, 
free Europe is that conflicts must be resolved by 
peaceful means and not by force of arms.
•	 It	demonstrates	that	a	number	of	the	partnerships,	
etc., that have formed the foundation for EU and 
NATO policies, have been inadequate. Therefore, the 
crisis creates a need to rethink Western strategy.
In the light of this new risk, the West’s existing policy 
is inadequate. This does not necessarily mean that the 
policy hitherto has been mistaken, and it absolutely does 
not mean that we are facing a new Cold War. However, 
the West must realise that Russian governance does not 
have the same general goals as those of the West. 
Although the West can thus in the short term be 
content to overcome the crisis, the consequences for 
the European security policy framework in the medium 
and long term will be appreciable.
These consequences will apply not least to the West 
itself because the crisis has revealed differences in 
priorities among the Western powers and challenged 
the world view that the West’s policy has been based 
on. Furthermore, the West must acknowledge that 
Russia is willing to use military means to accomplish its 
goals. This presents EU foreign policy in particular with 
a number of fundamental challenges and means that 
NATO must rethink and thoroughly reconsider its obliga-
tions under Article 5, especially with regard to the East 
European member states, where the Baltic States are 
particularly vulnerable. 
Resume
Recommendations 
NATO should adopt a declaration on transatlantic 
 solidarity, which explicitly mentions the Baltic States 
and is followed up by concrete initiatives such as mak-
ing NATO’s Baltic Air Policing a permanent mission.
NATO should adopt a declaration that obliges the 
 European countries to increase their defence budgets 
to 2 per cent of GDP within 15 years.
Partnerships must be reconsidered in a more 
 dynamic form. Firstly, a clearer distinction must be made 
between types of partnership with particular emphasis 
on partnerships in neighbouring areas. Secondly, NATO 
must arrive at a more strategic view of how partnerships 
can in the long term contribute to NATO’s security by 
developing institutions and capacities in certain partner 
countries. How NATO will commit to the individual part-
nerships and how partnerships place partners under an 
obligation during crises must be made far clearer. 
A nATo-EU task force should be established, which 
would coordinate the policies of the two organisations 
with regard to  Russia in order to strengthen cooperation 
between the  organisations.
NATO should make energy independence part of its 
defence planning process to give European countries 
a goal for the extent to which they should reduce their 
dependence on Russia for energy supplies. An initiative 
of this kind would have to be carefully coordinated with 
the EU.
7
8In Europe the post-Cold War period ended on 28 Febru-
ary 2014. Historians have discussed when the Cold War 
ended: was it when the Berlin Wall fell on 9 November 
1989, when the Warsaw Pact closed shop in 1991, or 
when the Soviet Union broke down during the same 
year? Historians will also discuss whether 28 February 
2014 marked the beginning of a new epoch of secu-
rity policy in European history. Historians have these 
discussions because such events are the culmination 
of a series of events and the beginning of something 
new. It can be difficult to decide whether a given event 
is a precondition for something new or is something 
new in itself. When Russia’s President Vladimir Putin 
ordered Russian troops to enter Crimea as his response 
to the Ukrainian revolution, which had recently ousted 
the Ukrainian president and placed Ukraine’s geopoliti-
cal position at risk, it was one of those types of event 
in which the spring of history was wound up and then 
released to set a new chain of events in motion. 
In other countries, the terrorist attacks in the United 
States on 11 September 2001 were the event that 
ended the post-Cold War period. From an American 
perspective, the attacks defined a new security policy 
agenda that triggered a series of events in Asia and 
the Middle East that marked 11 September 2001 as 
the beginning of a new epoch, rather than the break-
down of the Soviet empire. In East Asia, globalisation 
and the consequent economic growth in China have 
dictated the agenda over the past two decades. While 
these events have not gone unnoticed in Europe, they 
have not shaped European policy, which is one of the 
reasons why Europeans and Americans have not always 
seen eye to eye about what the central challenges were 
and how they should be tackled. The fact that Europe 
committed to the so-called war on terror was chiefly be-
cause nobody felt that there were more pressing prob-
lems of security policy closer to home. As the Americans 
pushed for a more global European commitment, it was 
also based to a great extent on the slogan that ‘Europe 
was finished’1 in the sense that the expansion of the EU 
and NATO after the Cold War had resulted in a stable 
security environment on the Continent.
However, this argument no longer held water on 28 
February 2014. Historians will continue to discuss which 
factors provoked it. Was it the EU that had recklessly 
overplayed its hand by offering Ukraine an association 
agreement that raised hopes on the streets of Kiev, but 
also threatened Russian interests and therefore led to a 
situation in which Russia felt it had to save what it could 
of its assets when the regime in Kiev fell? Was the rapid 
deployment of Russian special forces in Crimea actually 
the realisation of a long-standing plan to reconquer lost 
territory when the opportunity arose? Irrespective of 
which factors triggered the concrete events, the Russian 
annexation of Crimea and the subsequent destabilisa-
tion of Ukraine will have far-reaching consequences on 
the following three grounds:
•	 It	will	reduce	strategic	warning	due	to	Russia’s	will	
and ability to use armed force in its neighbouring 
area. 
•	 It	is	apparently	the	definitive	Russian	departure	from	
the idea of a united, free Europe that began with the 
Helsinki Process and was realised with the integration 
of economies and societies after the end of the Cold 
War. An important element in the idea of a united, 
free Europe is that conflicts must be resolved by 
peaceful means and not by force of arms.
•	 The	events	demonstrate	that	a	number	of	the	part-
nerships, etc., that have formed the foundation for 
EU and NATO policies, have been inadequate. There-
fore, the crisis creates a need to rethink Western 
strategy.
Therefore, the post-Cold War era has now ended. The 
historians of the future will discuss whether there was 
an inter-war period between the Cold War and the Cold 
War Light2 or whether it was a transition to a balance 
of power system in Europe with Russia attempting to 
establish its own Eurasian bloc, possibly in an alliance 
with China. 
•	 One	thing	that	is	certain,	however,	is	that	this	is	not 
a question of a new Cold War along the lines of the 
conflict between the West and the Soviet Union that 
lasted from the 1940s to the 1980s. There are several 
fundamental differences, namely:
•	 It	is	not	a	question	of	an	ideological	confrontation	
in which the parties represent ideological alterna-
tives that are relevant for the development of each 
party’s society. The Russian state ideology formulated 
by Putin is not a product that can be exported, even 
though the citizens of some other countries may 
agree on such matters as anti-Americanism, and even 
Introduction
9though some sectors of the European right wing are 
impressed by Putin’s leadership.
•	 The	new	confrontation	is	not	a	confrontation	be-
tween two different ideologies but is, in the words 
of US president Barack Obama, a confrontation 
between two different types of governance.
•	 Russia	is	integrated	into	the	global	economy,	which	
was not the case with the chiefly separate economic 
system that the Soviet Union and its allies operated 
with during the Cold War.
•	 There	is	no	corresponding	high	level	of	mobilisation	
due to rivalling military alliances in which the basic 
conflict of the Cold War could heat up at short notice 
with the risk of a global nuclear war. 
•	 Due	to	the	factors	above,	there	are	many	more	and	
more comprehensive opportunities for a softening of 
the conflict.
Putin’s Russia is thus far less of a military, economic and 
political threat than the Soviet Union was. This comes 
not least to expression in NATO’s overwhelming military 
superiority as shown in figure 1. In a direct conventional 
confrontation, NATO would in all probability be able 
to defeat Russian forces. However, it is Russia that has 
so far used this asymmetry to its advantage. John R. 
Schindler calls this Special War and it consists of using 
military forces in combination with intelligence op-
erations and similar measures, just under the military 
horizon,3 so Russia has been able to just avoid a direct 
confrontation with the West. Instead, Russia has struck 
in places where Western interests and intentions were 
unclear and where its intervention did not justify a 
military response from the West. During negotiations in 
Geneva, Russia even acquired a diplomatic framework 
for its continued involvement in Ukraine on the pretext 
of intending to stabilise the situation. 
Deprived in this way of its obvious military advan-
tage, the West has had fewer cards to play. While the 
debate in the West dealt with which risks the allies 
were prepared to run in relation to Russia, Russia has 
simply run risks on the assumption that the West would 
be unable to respond before it was too late. That the 
intervention in Crimea constituted a considerable risk 
for Russia was clearly indicated by the reaction on the 
Moscow stock exchange in February-March 2014. The 
fear of sanctions and repercussions with regard to the 
Russian economy triggered a dramatic fall in share 
prices while the reaction on the West European stock 
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exchanges was far less dramatic. However, they were 
more aware of the risk to the European economy if gas 
supplies were influenced than was the case with the 
New York stock exchange where, in an economy that is 
not dependent on Russian energy supplies, the crisis had 
little influence. These different reactions showed that 
Russia basically runs a greater risk in connection with 
a conflict than the West does. However, on the other 
hand, it showed that Russian investors had decided that 
the Russian Government could get away with its policy 
– perhaps because of Western investors’ recognition of 
the fact that what was happening in Ukraine was not 
decisive for the West and its economy.4 
It is appropriate in this connection to differentiate 
between vulnerability and sensitivity.5 The dramatic 
reaction on the Moscow stock exchange reflected the 
fact that the Russian economy is structurally vulnerable 
because of its great dependence on energy exports. 
A boycott on Russian energy imports would therefore 
have serious consequences. The European economies 
are sensitive to changes in oil prices or restrictions on 
Russian oil imports due to sanctions. Some Western 
companies are also vulnerable with regard to devel-
opments in relations between Russia and the West 
because they have major investments in Russia. This 
differentiation between sensitivity and vulnerability il-
lustrates a difference in risks in the short and long term 
respectively. In the long term, Russia runs the greatest 
risk because the European countries can reorganise their 
energy infrastructures to reduce their dependence on 
Russian energy. However, it would require time to make 
these changes and the West therefore runs the greatest 
risk in the short term. This gives Russia time to play its 
energy card in the situation and hope that Europeans 
will not reorganise their energy consumption in the long 
term. The requirement for risk management is therefore 
greater for Europeans, who must tackle risks in the 
short and long term, than it is for the Russians.
Although there is thus every reason to keep calm, it is 
also necessary to take into account that the present 
confrontation with Russia could be serious and could 
constitute a geostrategic challenge in itself. This report 
deals with the consequences of the Ukraine Crisis for 
Western countries security and defence policy and, as 
Kilde: Center for Militære Studier
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this policy is to a great extent shaped by the require-
ments and options consequent on memberships of 
NATO and the EU, the analysis of what the crisis means 
for these two organisations plays a central role in the 
report. Finally, the report outlines the possible conse-
quences for the Western strategy. However, we focus 
first on the factor that triggered the crisis, namely 
Putin’s policy. 
11
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After a telephone conversation with Putin at the begin-
ning of March 2014, the German Chancellor, Angela 
Merkel, informed her allies that the Russian president 
took a completely different view of events in Ukraine 
than she did – he appeared to be living in ”a different 
world”.6 On the face of things, this remark could seem 
like a naive expression of surprise from the head of a 
trading state who had spoken on the telephone to a 
president with other, more militaristic priorities. Seen 
from this perspective, the chancellor would appear 
to have confirmed the idea that Europeans are from 
Venus while Americans – and Russians – are from Mars.7 
However, perhaps the point Merkel was making was 
not that she could not understand the other world that 
Putin lives but, on the contrary, that she understood it 
all too well. This was not simply a conversation between 
a chancellor and a president, it was also a conversation 
between a former citizen of the DDR and a former KGB 
agent who had been stationed in the DDR. 
Putin has made the regeneration of the Russian na-
tion his project. For him, the end of the Cold War and 
the breakdown of the Soviet Union was a defeat for 
Russia rather than a victory for democracy over com-
munism. In March 2014, 63 per cent of Russians agreed 
with the president that Russia had regained its status as 
a superpower according to an opinion poll conducted 
by the Russian Levada Centre, which could also report 
that 80 per cent of Russians approved of Putin’s policy.8 
In justifying the annexation of Crimea in a speech at 
the Kremlin on 18 March 2014, the president took his 
point of departure in an international situation that he 
claimed made it necessary to act strongly and swiftly:
 Like a mirror, the situation in Ukraine reflects what is 
going on and what has been happening in the world 
over the last several decades. After the dissolution of 
bipolarity on the planet, we no longer have stabil-
ity. Key international institutions are not getting any 
stronger; on the contrary, in many cases, they are 
sadly degrading. Our Western partners, led by the 
United States of America, prefer not to be guided by 
international law in their practical policies, but by the 
rule of the gun.9
From Putin’s point of view, the United States and its 
allies had done whatever lay within their power from 
Kosovo to Iraq, in spite of international law and Russia’s 
wishes. Therefore, he had nothing left but contempt for 
the West’s protests over Russia’s actions in Crimea. By 
acting ”irresponsibly and unprofessionally” in Ukraine, 
the West had infringed Russia’s rights and thus triggered 
the Russian reaction, according to Putin, who, in Russian 
strategy documents and in his speech at the Kremlin, 
listed the West’s violations of Russian interests at length. 
Taken together, these violations amounted to a strategy 
in Putin’s view: ”we have every reason to assume that 
Putin's world
13
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the infamous policy of containment, led in the 18th, 
19th and 20th centuries, continues today.”10 For Putin, 
there is thus a direct connection from the Crimean War 
(1853-56) to the Ukraine Crisis in 2014. The alliance 
with the Western powers during World War I and World 
War II has been forgotten, as has the cooperation on re-
forms in the post-communist period. Viewed in this way, 
Russia is constantly under siege. The so-called liberation 
of Crimea can therefore best be seen as a sortie from a 
besieged fortress, where a Russia under siege is able to 
make use of the shorter lines of communication inside 
the fortress to strike in the places where the Western be-
siegers have left holes in their blockades. If this analogy 
seems too militaristic, Russian strategy documents are 
on the other hand full of references to competition be-
tween Russia and its surroundings. Russia’s foreign policy 
concept from 2013 contains the following statement:
 
 For the first time in modern history, global competi-
tion takes place on a civilizational level, whereby 
various values and models of development based 
on universal principles of democracy and market 
economy start to clash and compete against each 
other. Cultural and civilizational diversity of the world 
becomes more and more manifest.11 
Foreign policy is regarded as an important tool in 
ensuring competitiveness in this world of competition 
between civilisations.12 Precisely because civilisations be-
come the organising category, national borders between 
countries within these civilisations play a lesser role. This 
thinking is the justification for the dominating, defin-
ing role that the Russian Government wants to have 
within its civilisation. The Russian foreign policy concept 
thus states how ”Russia will maintain its active role in 
the political and diplomatic conflict settlement in the 
CIS space”13, and how the establishment of a Eurasian 
economic union14 will bind the former Soviet countries 
together. Putin’s speech and the policy documents for 
the Russian government appear to be motivated by a 
feeling that the 21st century will be dominated by con-
frontation between Russia and the rest of the world. It 
is time to prepare. However, it is equally clear, also when 
reading between the lines, that Russia is afraid that it is 
too weak and that its preparations have begun too late. 
Few feelings can be more frightening for the members 
of a foreign policy elite than the feeling that history’s 
drums are summoning people to assemble but failing 
to awaken them from their sleep. The end of the Cold 
War is the source of this uncertainty and the feeling of 
Russian weakness.
14
”Russia has overcome the consequences of the systemic 
political and socio-economic crisis of the end of the 
20th century.”15 The breakdown of the Soviet Union and 
the subsequent political chaos, which threatened social 
cohesion and the country’s unity, mean that Russia does 
not see national security as a question of defending 
itself against foreign enemies, but rather as a need to 
focus on the far more comprehensive task of saving 
the nation. National security can be achieved by virtue 
of ”important social, political and economic transfor-
mations intended to create secure conditions for the 
realisation of Russian citizens’ constitutional rights and 
freedoms, the stable development of the country, and 
the preservation of the territorial integrity and sover-
eignty of the state.”16 
It is common to the strategy documents, but perhaps 
most clear in the national security strategy, that they are 
based on an organic view of Russia. Russia is depicted 
as people are depicted in Maslow’s psychological 
works,17 in which certain basic material needs must be 
fulfilled before immaterial needs. The whole person and 
the whole nation must be intact and in good physical 
health. Russian health, however, was threatened by 
the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the disintegra-
tion of the country. In concrete terms, this has come to 
expression in factors such as low life expectancy and, 
in more abstract terms at national level, in which the 
strategic focus in on those limbs that have been severed 
from the national body is such that it is difficult not to 
regard it as a temporary problem that must be solved by 
reuniting them with the national body. Once again, the 
idea of fulfilling material needs before immaterial needs 
is in evidence. Russia cannot make any progress before 
its economy and territory have been secured. 
Putin spoke in the Kremlin on 18 March 2014 about 
how ”in people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has always 
been an inseparable part of Russia”. This reflects a sharp 
focus on enabling those parts of Russia that have been 
separated from the mother country to return and make 
Russia whole again – geographically and spiritually. This 
involves rediscovering the authentic Russia. ”Authenti-
cally Russian ideals and spirituality are being reformed, 
alongside a dignified attitude to historical memory.”18 
According to Putin, Russia has found itself. This is not 
as such either a break with the Russia of the Tsars or of 
the Soviets, but an authentic Russian nation, a historical 
truth about the Russian people.
An authentic Russia is not an abstraction, on the 
contrary, it is defined in quite concrete terms. Russia’s 
national security strategy thus identifies a number of 
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points that can be used to measure how secure Russia 
and its citizens are. These points are macroeconomic 
indicators that include the rise in consumer prices, 
income distribution, the debt-equity ratio in the national 
budget, health, culture and education budgets and 
military spending.19 The health of the state, society and 
the individual are linked in concrete and figurative terms 
in such a way as to oblige the Russian Government to 
intervene at all levels in order to ensure healthy develop-
ment. In this view, the state must take responsibility for 
society and the individual that is not taken by Western 
governments. This means that the Russian state must 
be stronger than a Western state in order to be able to 
take overall responsibility for the nation’s health. 
While Western governments take responsibility for 
the economy, for health, education and security, they do 
not do so as part of an overall package defined in rela-
tion to national security. This extremely broad security 
concept turns a crisis-ridden school system, a housing 
bubble and other circumstances, which in the West 
would be tasks for the market and civil society to per-
form, into state issues of a character that could threaten 
the security of the state and therefore need extraordi-
nary measures. Based on experiences connected with 
the collapse after the fall of the Soviet Union, Putin’s 
government has therefore ”securitised”20 social devel-
opments to an extent where the only possible solution 
is a strong leader at the helm of a strong state. Orlando 
Figes sees this as an expression of the way in which 
what are known as the siloviki, i.e. people who, like the 
president himself with a past in the intelligence services 
and the so-called power ministries, regard governmental 
power as something that must ensure the state’s inter-
ests rather than liberate citizens.21
Whereas Western states increasingly came to regard 
the state as a tool designed to ensure citizens’ rights 
and freedom of expression throughout the 19th and 
20th centuries, Russian state ideology, as formulated 
by the Putin administration, sees the state as a tool for 
guiding citizens along a predefined path. In this sense, 
they are in line with 300 years of Russian-style versions 
of Western reforms from Peter the Great to Catherine 
II the Great up to today. Under Catherine II, attempts 
were made centrally to reform Russia based on inspi-
ration derived from the philosophy of the European 
Enlightenment while at the same time retaining the 
national Russian character.22 Peter the Great’s coercive 
management of reforms was notorious because of its 
detailed regulation of everything right down to the 
length of the aristocracy’s beards. This state control of 
reforms and developments has on the one hand fasci-
nated the West, as after the Bolshevik revolution, but 
has been seen on the other hand as incompatible with 
Western values.
The result is two radically different views of what 
the tasks of politicians and foreign policy politicians 
in particular consist of. Western politics deals to a 
considerable extent with change. A Western politi-
cian runs for office in order to change something and 
Western politicians therefore to a great extent compete 
to extend rights or to ensure public benefits for new 
groups. According to Russian security strategy, however, 
politics does not deal with change, but involves finding 
the natural, stable core of the national community and 
ensuring that national developments stay on this track. 
These different state ideologies come clearly to 
expression in the debate on homosexuality. Although 
there are naturally different views of this in the West, 
the tendency for many years has been a heightening of 
moral and legal equality between homosexuality and 
heterosexuality. Therefore Western opinions of the Putin 
government’s anti-homosexual legislation have been 
characterised by an equal measure of indignation and 
surprise. Such legislation was a logical consequence 
of the belief in a pure, strong national body in Putin’s 
ideology, but as correspondingly illogical from a Western 
point of view. This is reflected by the fact that 74 per 
cent of Russians do not feel that society should accept 
homosexuality, while 88 per cent of Europeans and 80 
per cent of North Americans feel the opposite.23 Obama 
made it clear that he understands the conflict with 
Russia as a conflict between two state philosophies. In 
his speech in Brussels on 26 March 2014, the president 
said:
 Throughout human history, societies have grappled 
with fundamental questions of how to organize 
themselves, the proper relationship between the 
individual and the state, the best means to resolve 
inevitable conflicts between states. And it was here 
in Europe, through centuries of struggle – through 
war and enlightenment, repression and revolution – 
that a particular set of ideals began to emerge: The 
belief that through conscience and free will, each of 
16
us has the right to live as we choose. The belief that 
power is derived from the consent of the governed, 
and that laws and institutions should be established 
to protect that understanding. And those ideas 
eventually inspired a band of colonialists across 
an ocean, and they wrote them into the founding 
documents that still guide America today, including 
the simple truth that all men – and women – are 
created equal.
 But those ideals have also been tested – here in Eu-
rope and around the world. Those ideals have often 
been threatened by an older, more traditional view 
of power. This alternative vision argues that ordinary 
men and women are too small-minded to govern 
their own affairs, that order and progress can only 
come when individuals surrender their rights to an 
all-powerful sovereign. Often, this alternative vision 
roots itself in the notion that by virtue of race or faith 
or ethnicity, some are inherently superior to others, 
and that individual identity must be defined by ”us” 
versus ”them”, or that national greatness must flow 
not by what a people stand for, but by what they are 
against.24
The conflict between Russia and the West that Putin de-
scribed as a policy of containment is a conflict between 
two different types of governance for Obama, with the 
Russian state and the Western states each in its own 
camp. While the conflict for Putin is an expression of 
different civilisational and geopolitical realities that cre-
ate a conflict between ”Fort Russia” and its besiegers, 
the geopolitical issues for Obama are things that can be 
overcome if there is agreement to govern the state in a 
certain way. In Obama’s view, civilisation is a fellowship 
based on development rather than a point of departure 
for conflict. 
As such, Obama sees the opportunities for develop-
ment similarly to the way they are seen by Madeleine K. 
Albright and Bill Clinton (see below), but these oppor-
tunities are clearly overshadowed by the concrete chal-
lenge from Putin, also for the president. This challenge 
appears so much the more serious precisely because 
Russia is not on its own as far as Obama is concerned. 
Russia’s thinking can spread and threaten coexistence 
in Europe. This threat had already given rise to a strong 
Western reaction as could be seen, for instance, on the 
outbreak of the Cold War. In this connection, George 
Kennan attempted in 1947 to explain to his superiors 
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at the Department of State in Washington that the 
communist leadership did not want to see coexistence 
after World War II: ”From the Russian-Asiatic world 
out of which they had emerged they carried with them 
a scepticism as to the possibilities of permanent and 
peaceful coexistence of rival forces.”25 Obama may well 
have arrived at a similar conclusion:
To be honest, if we defined our interests narrowly, if 
we applied a cold-hearted calculus, we might decide to 
look the other way… But that kind of casual indiffer-
ence would ignore the lessons that are written in the 
cemeteries of this continent. It would allow the old 
way of doing things to regain a foothold in this young 
century. And that message would be heard not just in 
Europe, but in Asia and the Americas, in Africa and the 
Middle East.26
Russian policy has clearly been experienced as a 
challenge to world order in the United States. The 
Obama administration had otherwise made it clear that 
a challenge of this kind was more to be feared from 
China than from Russia. The administration therefore 
decided in 2012 to pivot US foreign and security policy 
towards Asia in order to prevent China from challenging 
US and allied interests in the region in the long term.27 
Now, however, it appears that the US pivot has become 
a pirouette. Not only has Russia challenged the United 
States, Putin has formulated his challenge in terms that 
make it very difficult for him to mobilise his allies. Putin 
and his power elite cannot raise their banner on behalf 
of the working class and the oppressed throughout the 
world as his communist predecessors in the Kremlin 
could. On the contrary, Putin’s concept concerning 
confrontation between nations and civilisations stands 
between him and his allies. Based on this concept, Rus-
sian interests are equally at odds with those of China as 
with those of Europe and the US. 
Putin’s foreign policy doctrine does not have a positive 
agenda, but one that is anti-American and anti-Western, 
something that may well sell tickets but which also 
reflects the fact that Russia and China are integrated into 
the global economy in two very different ways. Russia is 
an exporter of raw materials, while China is an importer 
of them and a manufacturer of consumer goods. China 
is therefore far better integrated into Western produc-
tion and consumer structures than is Russia. This must 
play a significant role in the materialistic reading of world 
politics that can be found in the Kremlin. 
By acting as he has in connection with the Ukraine 
Crisis, Putin has given the Beijing government a choice 
between integration with the West in a globalised world 
and conflict with the West; a choice that is more defini-
tive than China is probably comfortable with. There is 
sympathy in Beijing for anti-Western, anti-American 
rhetoric, but if China must choose between an aggres-
sive policy that involves intervening in other countries 
and conflict with the United States and a more cautious 
policy, Beijing will choose the latter. It is worth remem-
bering in this connection that while the West is in the 
habit of lumping the growth economies together and 
calling them the BRIC countries, Brazil, Russia, India and 
China not only have different interests, three of them 
have conflict-ridden histories. 
That China chose to abstain from voting in the UN 
Security Council and supporting Ukraine’s territorial 
integrity and independence should prompt the more 
thoughtful members of Russia’s foreign policy elite 
to consider how far-reaching cooperation with China 
would be (it should also be noted that Beijing took a 
similar position during the Russo-Georgian War). Simi-
larly, consideration should be given in Beijing’s foreign 
policy circles as to whether close cooperation with Rus-
sia might embroil China in conflicts that would present 
an obstacle to the country’s economic development at 
a time when continued growth is a top priority there. 
The Russian intervention in Ukraine could thus have 
highlighted the limits of an alliance between Beijing and 
the Kremlin.28 This could be exploited by the West in 
the same way that the US was able to create an alliance 
with China against the Soviet Union in the 1970s, which 
means that the West must be very careful to avoid al-
ienating China in the way it structures sanctions against 
Russia.
Russia’s intervention in Ukraine has thus given the 
West an opportunity to formulate a new policy on 
China and this will oblige it to reconsider its policy on 
Eastern Europe and Russia. With regard to the latter, 
it is necessary to briefly look at what the West’s policy 
towards Russia has been, and what consequences the 
events in Ukraine will have for NATO and EU policy in 
particular. 
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Western policy has not been based on Russia having 
become a liberal democracy. The years with Boris Yelt-
sin’s robber capitalism or Putin’s oppression of minorities 
and the bypassing of the constitution have shown with 
all possible clarity that this was not what Russia had 
become. Nor has Western policy been based on the idea 
that it would always possible to cooperate with Russia. 
The enlargement of NATO took place in opposition to 
the wishes of Russia, the intervention in the Kosovo 
Conflict (1999) took place in conflict with Russia which, 
during the final stages, sent soldiers into Kosovo ahead 
of the advancing NATO forces and Russia has obstructed 
Western policy in many areas such as Iraq, Iran and 
Syria. Western policy, however, has been based on the 
assumption that Russia would in time become a liberal 
democracy, which would have made it increasingly easy 
to find concrete solutions in relations with Russia. As 
Albright expressed it in Chicago on 2 October 1998:
 My job as Secretary of State is not to describe the 
worst possible outcome in Russia or anywhere else. 
It is to devise policies that protect American interests 
and encourage the best possible outcome. That has 
been our objective ever since the Russian tricolor rose 
above the Kremlin in 1991.29
She was not mistaken – the policy simply did not suc-
ceed. It was based on an alliance with reformers in 
Russia rather than with the Russian state. It was always 
quite clear in the West that the worst scenarios in Russia 
would involve conflict with the West, and they hovered 
like shadows over the West’s Russian policy. This was 
not least because a number of observers believed that 
the enlargement of NATO – in Kennan’s words – was 
a ”fateful error”, 30 that would force Russia to react. In 
order to prevent this reaction, NATO’s enlargement was 
combined with cooperation with Russia. The enlarge-
ment was slow and well considered because, as Bill 
Clinton said at a NATO summit in 1994, this approach to 
enlargement ”enables us to prepare and to work toward 
the enlargement of NATO. It enables us to do it in a way 
that gives us the time to reach out to Russia”.31 As the 
then Danish foreign minister, Niels Helveg Petersen, put 
it in the Danish Parliament in 1998: ”Security in Europe 
must be created with Russia, not against Russia.”32 
The West found itself in a constant dialogue with 
Russia on how European security architecture should be 
designed. A dialogue in which Russia did its best to use 
the possibility of a breakdown in Russia and in rela-
tions between Russia and the West as a threat against 
the West. After the end of the Cold War, Russia was so 
weak that this was its best weapon for the time being. If 
the West did not support Jeltsin’s regime, the argument 
from the Kremlin was that various old communists could 
come to power. During this period, Russia deliberately 
played on the fear of a new Cold War as a consequence 
of a breakdown in Russian reforms. An example of this 
was when Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev delivered a 
bellicose speech at the OSCE meeting in Stockholm in 
1992, which he subsequently withdrew with a remark 
to the effect that this would be the tone if the op-
position came to power in Russia. However, the West 
regarded the opposition as the voice of the past rather 
than of the future. As Albright told the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, Russia’s opposition to an 
enlargement of NATO was ”a product of old misconcep-
tions about NATO and old ways of thinking about its 
former satellites in central Europe. Instead of changing 
our policies to accommodate Russia’s outdated fears, we 
need to encourage Russia’s more modern aspirations.”33 
If Russia realised these aspirations regarding modernisa-
tion, the country could become part of the European or-
der, which it had combated during its incarnation as the 
Soviet Union and that Russia was now sceptical about. 
”Only time will tell what Russia’s ultimate role in Europe 
will be”, said Bill Clinton when he presented a scenario 
for a democratised Russia that lived in peace with the 
rest of Europe. In this case, said Bill Clinton, ”no doors 
can be sealed shut to Russia – not NATO’s, not the 
EU’s”.34 The open door was an important principle and 
the metaphor of the door was repeated and repeated 
in order to show that Russia would not be barred from 
Europe but could on the contrary take the decisive 
steps and enter the new European region as it had been 
organised after the Cold War. However, the metaphor 
also made it clear that while it was the West that was 
holding the door open, it was Russia that would have to 
approach it and cross the threshold. This constituted the 
goad in the West’s policy on Russia. 
The criticism that the West’s Russian policy was naïve 
overlooks the fact that it was only so to the extent that 
it was in the West’s interests to maintain an open atti-
tude to Russia. In Western eyes, Russia constituted a risk 
that was connected with a number of other policies that 
Western policy on Russia
had to be managed. The US ambassador in Moscow 
during the period 1987-1991, Jack Matlock, pointed out 
that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West no 
longer negotiated with Russia as an equal partner, but 
treated Russia like a loser through a ”cycle of dismissive 
actions”35 The truth was that Russia was too weak to 
oppose the enlargement of NATO, for instance, and that 
Soviet policy in Eastern Europe had left Russia with very 
few friends in the region. 
The Soviet Union had controlled the region by force 
and once its power evaporated, so did its influence. 
Russia had not and has not, as we have seen, achieved 
a position in its relations with its neighbours that is in-
clusive and appreciative in the same way as the Western 
foreign policy position. In other words, Russia offered lit-
tle else than opposition to change. Since the status quo 
was not in the interests of the West and the integration 
of Russia was not possible, Western policies focused on 
the concrete Russian opposition in the concrete case. 
Relations with Russia were thus rarely seen as a cohesive 
policy area; Russia’s opposition to this and that was 
rather seen as an element within a series of policy areas. 
This came best to expression perhaps when George 
W. Bush, as a newly-elected president, met Putin in 
Slovenia in 2001 and came to the conclusion after the 
meeting that he viewed Putin as ”a man deeply commit-
ted to his country and the best interests of his coun-
try”, and added that ”I appreciate very much the frank 
dialogue and that’s the beginning of a very constructive 
relationship.36 In other words, Bush acknowledged that 
Putin had his own Russian interests to take care of, but 
was saying at same time that they would not stand in 
the way of Bush’s policies. Not only were the problems 
isolated, their solution also depended on one man. 
This did not concern Russia’s interests because, in the 
final analysis, neither Bush nor his Western government 
colleagues acknowledged that these interests differed 
in the long term from those of the West; it concerned 
Putin’s interpretation of these interests and the degree 
to which it would be possible to make a deal with him. 
As so often before, relations with an authoritarian re-
gime were reduced to relations with the man at the top. 
After looking Putin straight in the eye, however, Bush 
continued with his plans for a missile defence system, 
the enlargement of NATO and, after 11 September 
2001, the invasion of Iraq. All of which were contrary to 
the wishes of Putin and Russia. 
In the belief that time was on the side of the West, the 
problems with Russia were treated as isolated problems 
rather than as an expression of general tendencies. 
The conflict in Chechnya, which began in the 1990s, 
was seen as a local, Islamist-inspired rebellion against 
the central government in Moscow rather than as an 
expression of the central government tightening its grip 
on the regions and replacing a pluralist, federal system 
with rigorous control from Moscow. The invasion of 
Georgia in 2008 was seen as a local, nationalist conflict 
where President Mikheil Saakashvili’s defiance of Russia 
was seen as equally much of a major problem as the 
subsequent Russian invasion, rather than as a challenge 
to European security. Russian hackers’ attack on Estonia 
in 2007 was seen as an example of the risk of cyber 
warfare in the future rather than as an expression of the 
Russian will to also use this area to destabilise former 
Soviet republics. Russian support of Bashar al-Assad’s 
regime in Syria was similarly seen as an expression of 
relations between Syria and Russia that had their roots 
in the Cold War and not as a general opposition to 
Western intervention and as a defence of allied regimes 
without due regard to the way they treated their own 
citizens. The Ukraine Crisis cancelled out this reading 
of Moscow’s policy as a reaction to isolated events that 
could be excused on the basis of concrete circumstanc-
es. Instead, the Russian intervention in Crimea became 
the final piece of evidence in a series, where events 
in Chechnya, Georgia, Estonia and Syria appear as 
part of the indictment against the Kremlin. The 
belief that time is on the side of the West is 
no longer current.
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NATO and EU
With the passing of the belief that Russia is part of the 
West’s future, the view of Russian opposition to West-
ern policies as a risk connected with a given policy also 
passes. Instead of being seen as a disruptive factor in a 
number of different areas, Russia is now seen as a risk in 
itself. ”Ukraine cannot be viewed in isolation,” conclud-
ed NATO’s Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 
in a speech at the Brookings Institution on 19 March 
2014. Fogh Rasmussen continued:
 And this crisis is not just about Ukraine. We see what 
could be called 21st century revisionism. Attempts to 
turn back the clock. To draw new dividing lines on 
our maps. To monopolise markets. Subdue popula-
tions. Re-write, or simply rip up, the international rule 
book. And to use force to solve problems – rather 
than the international mechanisms that we have 
spent decades to build.37 
In this view, the consequences of the Russian interven-
tion in Ukraine is that NATO must see Russia as part of 
its future rather than as part of its past. Where Albright 
talked about Russia’s outdated fear in 1997, the fear 
of the NATO countries has now been aroused. In his 
speech, Fogh Rasmussen emphasised that ”in times 
like this, when the security of the Euro-Atlantic area is 
challenged, the North Atlantic Alliance has not wavered. 
And it will not waver. For 65 years, we have been clear 
in our commitment to one another as Allies. And to the 
global security system within which NATO is rooted.”38 
For a Secretary-General who had prioritised relations 
with Russia, the events in Ukraine were a confirma-
tion of the need for NATO to formulate a joint strategy 
regarding Russia instead of seeing Russia in terms of 
concrete subsidiary challenges regarding other objec-
tives that NATO might propose for itself. Fogh Rasmus-
sen thus paved the way for NATO to place relations 
with Russia at the top of the agenda for the first time in 
many years at the Cardiff summit in September 2014. 
On the face of things, the choice of Jens Stoltenberg 
as Fogh Rasmussen’s successor appears to be support 
for this new order. As the Prime Minister of Norway, 
Stoltenberg was responsible for a defence policy that 
prioritised the defence of the Norwegian border with 
Russia and power projection in the northern areas in 
the form of new frigates and new fighter aircrafts, and 
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a foreign policy that resulted, among other things, in a 
treaty that concluded a long-standing conflict with Rus-
sia on its maritime boundaries. Stoltenberg symbolises 
the mixture of rigour and willingness to negotiate that 
NATO wishes to communicate to Russia. 
The ISAF coalition in Afghanistan has dictated NATO’s 
agenda since 2006. Discussions in NATO have dealt with 
running operations in Afghanistan and other operations 
that followed in the wake of 11 September 2001 and 
the allies’ opportunities to contribute to these opera-
tions. Classic NATO questions, such as how much Eu-
ropeans contributed to the alliance by comparison with 
the Americans, how much money should be invested 
in new technologies and how the alliance’s power and 
command structure could best be organised, have been 
discussed over the past years at NATO’s headquarters 
and in the capitals of the allied countries. However, 
these questions have often been put in the new opera-
tional context. With the prospect of this context dissolv-
ing with the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and on the 
basis of the cuts in defence budgets, NATO will be faced 
with the challenge of setting the agenda for the future 
at the Cardiff summit with no knowledge of what the 
future will bring. For NATO, part of the significance of 
the events in Ukraine lies in the fact that they are occur-
ring at a time when they will come to define the agenda 
at the Cardiff summit and thereby NATO’s agenda. In 
Fogh Rasmussen’s words: ”Later this year, in Wales in 
the United Kingdom, we will hold our next NATO Sum-
mit. We need to focus on the long-term strategic impact 
of Russia’s aggression on our own security.”39 
The West’s reaction to Russian aggression: 
then and now
The long-term consequences of Russia’s aggression for 
the West’s strategy is, in the nature of the case, difficult 
to assess at present. However, two things can be taken 
into consideration: 
•	 The	reaction	in	connection	with	previous	cases	of	
Russian aggression. This will make it possible to 
predict the debate that will follow from the events in 
Ukraine. 
•	 The	initiatives,	etc.,	that	are	already	on	NATO’s	agen-
da and will be furthered by the events in Ukraine and 
prioritised in the subsequent debate. 
When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, 
the initial reaction of the then US president, Jimmy 
Carter, was not unlike Obama’s reaction to the events in 
Ukraine. Carter saw the Soviet use of power against a 
neighbour as a breach of the policy of détente that had 
characterised the 1970s, and feared ”a return to the 
Cold War”.40 Whereas today we see the entire period 
as one long cold war from the end of the 1940s to 
1989, the Cold War was regarded as a closed chapter 
in 1979. Since President Richard Nixon’s policy re-
orientation towards the Soviet Union, the agenda called 
for cooperation rather than confrontation. This epoch 
ended in 1979 because, among other things, Carter, 
and not least President Ronald Reagan, who succeeded 
him, regarded the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as 
proof that the West had been naïve in believing that 
the Soviet Union wanted cooperation. In 1980, Robert 
Tucker summed this up as follows: ”the United States 
has steadily moved throughout the past decade toward 
an insolvent foreign policy.”41 As is the case today with 
Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, the Soviet Union’s 
intervention in Afghanistan led to a debate regarding 
how the Kremlin saw the world, what plans the leaders 
in the Kremlin had and what the West could and should 
do about them. As Carter said in 1979, the Soviet 
invasion ”gives rise to the most fundamental questions 
pertaining to international stability”.42 The invasion 
was one thing, but what would come after? Was the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan an isolated event that 
the Kremlin had felt obliged to carry out, or was it on 
the contrary a question of a Machiavellian plan in which 
Afghanistan was ”a stepping stone to possible control 
over much of the world’s oil supplies”43, or was Ukraine 
an expression of a strategy that had ”been in the mak-
ing for a decade?”44 
Then as now, analysing the Kremlin’s intentions and 
capacity to realise them was of central importance. If 
the invasion of Afghanistan was seen as an expres-
sion of an attempt by the Kremlin to outflank the West 
and gain control of the Middle East’s oilfields, , what 
was happening in Afghanistan was relevant for NATO 
and the rest of the world. Fogh Rasmussen regards the 
Ukraine Crisis as a wake-up call to the West regarding 
Russian intentions,45 while former US secretary of state, 
Hillary Clinton, compared the Russian arguments for an-
nexing Crimea with Hitler’s arguments for annexing the 
Sudetenland in 1938.46 Seen from this perspective, the 
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events in Crimea were not isolated acts, but were part 
of a broader, strategic context. 
Then as now, there was widespread criticism of the 
US president’s ”transparent failure to lead”, as Carter’s 
discharge of his office was characterised after the inva-
sion of Afghanistan and the breakdown of détente.47 
When asked on American TV to characterise Obama’s 
leadership during the Ukraine Crisis, Senator John Mc-
Cain said: ”I don’t know how it could have been weaker 
besides doing nothing.”48 Professor Eliot Cohen was 
equally sarcastic when he said that ”President Obama’s 
history of issuing warnings and, when they are ignored, 
moving on smartly to the next topic gave a kind of 
permission”.49 This criticism stemmed in the 1980s, as it 
does today, from frustration over the options to react to 
a crisis that appear to be on the table and the conse-
quent belief that better leaders would have been able 
to conjure up better solutions. Alternatives that could 
take account of the fact that Europeans were in mutual 
disagreement and in disagreement with the Americans 
as to what the correct policy with regard to the Kremlin 
would be. Lawrence Eagleburger, Assistant Secretary of 
State for European Affairs, admitted in the 1980s, that 
”détente for you, for Berliners, for Germans has made 
a difference … but for us détente has been a failure”.50 
The then West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, 
thus believed that ”precisely because relations are dif-
ficult and extremely complex, we need not less commu-
nication but more”.51 
Different interpretations of what the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan meant led to disagreement on security 
policy in the individual countries (an example from Den-
mark is what was known as the footnote era), among 
the European countries (where the German and British 
governments, for instance, disagreed in their assess-
ments of the situation) and between Europe and the 
United States. It is therefore worth noting how Hillary 
Clinton, who appears to be very interested in what 
voters will believe up to the next presidential election, 
carefully positioned herself far to the right of the presi-
dent she acted as foreign secretary for a year ago. The 
explanation could be that 67 per cent of American vot-
ers were in favour of the way Obama handled foreign 
policy in 2009, while this figure fell to 47 per cent (with 
45 per cent against) in March 2014.52 
In 1980, Americans chose Reagan instead of Carter, 
not least because Reagan promised leadership on 
foreign policy that the events in Afghanistan and Iran 
had shown that Carter couldn’t manage. The candidates 
for the next US presidential election may well have to 
compete on being the biggest hawk to make Europeans 
appear like a flock of sparrows. In this connection, Ital-
ian Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, was more concerned 
about avoiding a new cold war than stopping Russian 
Kilde: Center for Militære Studier
Prioriteringsakser i dansk forsvarspolitik Figur 8
A
rk
ti
s
INTOPSMyndighedsopgaver
Ø
ste
rsø
re
g
io
n
e
n
Kilde: http://fe-ddis.dk/Produkter/Risikovurderinger/Pages/Risikovurderinger.aspx
2004 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 20132005 2007
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Antal gange Rusland bliver benævnt i FE's risikovurderinger Figur 9
Source: IISS The Military Balance 2014
Russia NATONATO-Europa
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
Defence spending in Russia, NATO Europe and NATO USA i 2013 (mia. USD) Figure 1
january march aprilfebuary
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
Stock market reactions to the Russian occupation of Crimea, early 2014 Figure 2
FTSE 100 (England) S&P 500 (USA)
Source: http://concorde.ua/en/research/market-data/indices
DAX (German)MICEX (Russia)
Source: The Levada Center, Moscow – http://www.levada.ru/17-03-2014/pozitsii-rossii-na-mirovoi-arene
1999 2003 2007 2009 2011 2013 20152001 2005
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Russians who believe their country is a superpower (%) Figure 3
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Ændring i sociale udgifter og forsvarsudgifter i Danmark. Procent af BNP. Index 1990=100. Figur 7
European dependency on import of russian gas (% of total import of natural gas, 2012) Figure 6
Sociale udgifter Forsvarsudgifter
Kilde: OECD (2012), "Social Expenditure: Aggregated data", OECD Social Expenditure Statistics (database) og 
SIPRI (2012) http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database
Attitudes to the Ukraine Crisis in Germany Figure 5
Kilde: www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutschlandtrend2234.html
Holdningen blandt tyskere til om forskellige for-
anstaltninger over for Rusland er egnede
Entry ban
Økonomiske sanktioner
Militær hjælp til Ukraine
Uegnet
Egnet
Uegnet
Egnet
Uegnet
Egnet
41%
51%
43%
50%
75%
18%
Source: www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutschlandtrend2234.html. Maj 2014.
Entry ban
Economic sanctions
Military assistance to the Ukraine
Unsuitable
Suitable
Unsuitable
Suitable
Unsuitable
Suitable
41%
51%
43%
50%
75%
18%
Source: Financial Times
28. febuary 
Russia sends 
troops to Krimea
100
Czech Republic
100
Estonia/ 
Latvia/ 
Lithuania
100
Finland
100
Bulgaria
99,5
Slovakia
45,2
Slovenia71,0
Austria
28,1
Italy
59,5
Greece
43,7
Hungary 86,1
Rumania
79,8
Poland35,7
Germany15,6
France
11,2
Holland
24
aggression. Renzi warned the EU not to introduce more 
rigorous sanctions as this could mean an escalation, 
”that does not take us back to an iron curtain scenario. 
A scenario that probably only exists in the nightmares of 
some of the key actors in this situation, but which we 
must avoid.”53 Helmut Schmidt had a similar nightmare 
and brushed up his arguments from 1981.54 In Germa-
ny, the Ukraine Crisis has given rise to the coining of the 
designation Putin-Versteher to describe the influential 
elements of German opinion and the business commu-
nity that show understanding for Russia’s acts and reject 
introducing stricter sanctions against Russia.55
However, the 1980s can teach us how even weak 
European governments, that must operate in the face 
of divided opinion, can be influenced by a consistent 
US policy – not least because this policy reflects the 
influence of the US through NATO, the armed forces 
and members of the security policy elites, and can set 
an agenda that prioritises a policy of necessity. In the 
1980s, Europeans and Americans could play ”good cop-
bad cop” with regard to the Soviet Union without either 
party realising that this was what they were doing, and 
while continually reproaching each other for conducting 
an irresponsible policy. The requirement for being able 
to play this game successfully once again, however, is 
an American commitment in relation to Russia that is 
possibly not in place today. The EU similarly means that 
Europeans have the opportunity to play a weakened 
hand far more strongly today than 30 years ago, which 
could have the paradoxical effect of weakening the 
European position. 
The ability of the EU to conduct a collective policy 
with regard to Russia could be a problem in itself. 
This may have been the reason why Nick Witney from 
the European Council of Foreign Relations so harshly 
criticised those Europeans who believed that Russia 
constituted a serious threat that could best be com-
bated under the auspices of NATO: ”So let us thank the 
new Cold Warriors, but tell them they have mistaken 
their era. Let us celebrate NATO’s value as an insurance 
policy, but not confuse it with an adequate vehicle for 
Europe’s role in the world.”56 The Union’s foreign policy 
is based on the idea of exporting the values of integra-
tion and commerce. As Witney pointed out, European 
policy is not concerned with shielding member states 
against risks, which is the traditional task of security and 
defence policy, but with creating security and managing 
crises through what would be called aid and commercial 
policy in the member states. The defence policy dimen-
sion has been incorporated into these other policies. 
This approach to international relations requires not hav-
ing problems oneself, but solving those of others. That 
the Union can gain advantages from its policy is natu-
rally the point of departure, but these advantages are 
regarded in Brussels as something that the Union wins 
together with others. The cake grows in size through an 
increase in free trade and the climate becomes better 
for us all, etc. However, as previously mentioned, Russia 
is not playing such a plus-sum game. 
The EU’s handling of Ukraine’s association agree-
ment, which was the factor that initiated the crisis 
because the then Ukrainian president’s rejection of 
the agreement in favour of an agreement with Russia 
sent demonstrators into the streets, can to a certain 
extent be explained by the fact that EU foreign policy 
focused on added value rather than on risks. ”The 
European Union definitely miscalculated about Russia’s 
reaction,” concluded Lithuania’s Foreign Minister, Linas 
Linkevičius in the International New York Times, ”when 
you play soccer, there are rules of the game, but the 
other side turned out to be playing rugby with a bit of 
wrestling”.57 The EU’s problem is that it does not have 
a rugby team, only a football team. If a new cold war is 
in the offing, the EU’s ambitions for a common foreign 
policy in its existing form will be unsuitable. However, 
even if less confrontational scenarios come into play, 
the union will be fundamentally hampered by the fact 
that the world view that its policy is based on has been 
adjudged irrelevant in the Kremlin. 
Challenges for new EU and nATo leaders
However, the EU is central in the areas where it really 
possesses competences and expertise. The challenge will 
be to mobilise them in a coherent foreign policy that is 
coordinated with other players, primarily NATO. Cath-
erine Ashton’s successor as head of the union’s foreign 
policy must therefore: 
1. Prioritise the Union’s foreign policy measures in those 
areas where it will actually make a difference
2.  Coordinate these measures with NATO and the 
United States 
3.  Stop over-ambitious plans for a common foreign 
policy.
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This will achieve the effect of harmonising what the EU 
respectively says and does. An effort in the three areas 
would dramatically heighten the Union’s credibility, and 
credibility is exactly what the EU is lacking in relation to 
Russia. Finance and trade are central aspects of the EU 
and the EU therefore uses sanctions against Russia as a 
means to an end. However, the EU must rapidly decide 
whether sanctions work with regard to states that are 
governed like Russia.58
In September 2014, Stoltenberg will become the new 
Secretary-General of NATO. Stoltenberg must first and 
foremost work to increase NATO’s credibility. This is a 
far more concrete issue for NATO than it is for the EU 
because it involves NATO’s musketeer oath under Article 
5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Throughout NATO’s his-
tory, credibility in relation to the guarantee of security 
that the allies, and not least the US, gave the individual 
members has been decisive. Stoltenberg will thus have 
three main tasks:
1. Ensuring the credibility of Article 5 with regard to 
Russia. 
2. Coordinating with the EU and the US. 
3. Focusing attention on the European defence budgets 
and on how they can best be converted into practical 
capacities. The financial crisis has led to dramatic 
cuts in defence budgets, especially in those countries 
that are closest to Russia. This is problematic for their 
ability to provide a credible defence system, not least 
because the other European allies have also reduced 
their defence budgets and therefore do not appear 
to be the best helpers in an hour of need. 
The new heads of the EU’s foreign affairs policy and 
NATO respectively are faced with a challenge that they 
can only meet together and they should grasp the op-
portunity to establish a prominent, energetic partnership 
that can power the reorientation of European security 
policy and anchor it in cooperation with the United 
States. The following deals with concrete challenges fac-
ing the EU and NATO.
Challenges for the EU
Trade agreement · After the Ukraine Crisis, the trade 
agreement between the US and the EU has taken on 
new significance that far outreaches commercial policy. 
As the US president’s special trade delegate, Michael 
Forman, said on 13 March 2014: ”Right now, as we 
look around the world, there is a powerful reason for 
26
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Europe and the United States to come together to dem-
onstrate that they can take their relationship to a new 
level.”59 It will be the task of the EU's  European External 
Action Service  to communicate this strategic point in the 
European Commission so that negotiations on the trade 
agreement can lead to the establishment of a free-trade 
zone between the United States and the EU. 
Energy · Unlike the United States, which is gradually 
becoming self-supplying with energy, Europe is a net 
importer of energy and is expected to import even 
more over the next 20 years. Today, 32 per cent of the 
EU’s gas imports and 35 per cent of the EU’s oil imports 
come from Russia.60 The EU decided in March 2014 to 
initiate an analysis of the union’s energy security and a 
plan to reduce energy dependence. The analysis should 
be completed in June 2014 and it will present the Euro-
pean Commission with the challenge of finding a for-
mula for energy independence and the diversification of 
energy sources, at the same time as the union is bound 
by stringent environmental goals that oppose the use of 
atomic energy, shale gas and other energy sources that 
could effectively ensure energy independence.61 
Turkey · European policy and the attitude to foreigners 
has in a similar manner meant that the EU has not been 
able to incorporate Turkey, which could well become the 
next Ukraine. Not in the sense that Russia will begin to 
interfere with the country’s domestic affairs (it is more 
probable that Turkey will issue a critical statement about 
the treatment of minorities in Crimea), but in the sense 
that Turkey is another important strategic country in 
the EU’s neighbourhood that the union has chosen to 
neglect, precisely because the union’s foreign policy 
has not focused on protecting itself against future risks. 
The result is that Turkey, as was the case in Ukraine, has 
gradually moved away from the EU and that the union’s 
ability to influence the country’s development in a direc-
tion that is positive for Europe has steadily decreased. 
Europe’s negligence has given Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan a number of arguments for rejecting the 
European way for the benefit of a regime that is becom-
ing increasingly authoritarian, and a foreign policy that 
is similarly in conflict with European interests. A reflec-
tion regarding how Europe handled the Ukraine Crisis 
should include a reconsideration of partnerships and 
association agreements, etc., with the aim of preventing 
the situation regarding Turkey developing to a point at 
which the EU could initiate a crisis due to an incoherent 
policy or an ill-considered move.
Challenges for nATo
The Ukraine Crisis came at a point when NATO was in 
doubt as to what its primary task would be after the 
war in Afghanistan. In 2015, government control will be 
transferred to the Afghans and the question will then 
become what NATO should do with itself. Fundamen-
tally, a defence alliance has no need of a task, but can 
regard itself as insurance that member states should 
preferably not need. Although strident voices have spo-
ken in favour of a NATO of this kind, NATO has defined 
its existence in terms of projects since the end of the 
Cold War. These have taken the form of stabilising mis-
sions in the Balkans and the enlargement in the 1990s, 
anti-terror operations and the war in Afghanistan from 
2001 to date. These projects have been central to 
NATO’s narrative about itself, even though NATO has 
in reality been involved in many other things. After the 
war in Afghanistan, NATO has therefore been on the 
lookout for a new project and a new narrative. On the 
one hand, a number of countries wanted continued 
focus on a global NATO that would find partners in 
Asia, train soldiers in Africa and gradually commit itself 
in the Arctic. On the other hand, a number of countries 
wanted NATO to turn its attention to Europe again and 
focus on the defence against Russia. The Ukraine Crisis 
has not done away with these two ambitions but has 
made it possible to combine them – not least because 
the need to deploy forces in the eastern NATO countries 
has suddenly become more concrete. Such deployments 
make the same demand for capabilities as deployments 
outside NATO’s sphere and the challenge to strength 
structures and training that formerly lay in talking about 
a NATO that was more focused on its domestic chal-
lenges, has therefore decreased. At the same time, the 
view that there is a threat from Russia has drawn more 
attention to the need of the Eastern European NATO 
members to invest in their own defence – both from the 
old NATO countries and the Eastern European countries 
themselves. Furthermore, focusing on more traditional 
ground operations fits in well with the tendency of the 
armed forces’ desire to focus on building up fundamen-
tal skills in connection with conventional operations 
after ten years of operations. Russia’s intervention in 
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Ukraine therefore strengthens a number of existing 
tendencies and this is part of the explanation why it has 
taken on major importance for NATO.
Partnerships · Like the EU, NATO has found it difficult 
to define how to cooperate with countries that were 
not members of NATO or were not about to become 
members. At the Chicago summit in 2012, heads of 
state and governments adopted a declaration which 
stated that ”partnerships play an important role in 
promoting international peace and security” and, at the 
coming Cardiff summit, partnerships have been identi-
fied as one of the central subjects. Today there is a wide 
range of partners in several different groups – from 
the Middle Eastern and North African countries in the 
Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation 
Initiative to partners across the world such as Australia 
and South Korea and a heterogeneous Partnership 
for Peace group with countries, such as Sweden and 
Austria, together with central Asian countries. Given 
such a heterogeneous mix, it is high time for NATO to 
begin reorganising and restructuring its many partner-
ship relations. 
Partnerships enhance NATO’s ability to fulfil its own 
role (as a force multiplier) around the world. In the 
European region, partnerships are at the same time 
the central mechanism for stabilising and promoting 
neighbouring areas around the territories of the NATO 
members. After the crisis in Ukraine, which, from 1997, 
has had a special partnership relation by virtue of the 
NATO-Ukraine Commission, it is particularly important 
for NATO to strengthen partnership relations and the 
formal framework. This applies to partners in Western 
Europe, especially Finland and Sweden, to partners 
further east such as Ukraine and Georgia and to NATO’s 
global partnerships in the form of countries (such as 
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Japan and Australia) and international organisations 
such as the UN and the EU. The heightened geopoliti-
cal insecurity in Europe makes it clear that the practical 
content and actual outcome of partnerships have risen 
considerably in strategic value. Unfortunately, NATO has 
not been correspondingly clear with regard to its allies 
and partners about the definition of a partnership, what 
it could be used for and what guarantees of security 
partnerships could potentially offer.
Because partnerships were an alternative to member-
ship for a number of European countries, they never 
received major institutional attention. NATO’s formal 
partnership structures were developed in the 1990s as 
part of the long-term reaction to the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and within the framework of the work on the 
later enlargement of NATO. During the ISAF mission 
in Afghanistan, partners’ operative contributions were 
extremely valuable for NATO. Partnerships were seen 
as stable, while membership processes were seen as 
dynamic and were therefore prioritised. In 2011, NATO 
decided to group all partnership offers in a single 
framework (Partnership Cooperation Menu), from which 
all partner countries could choose the desired elements. 
The idea of a menu underplays the importance of part-
nerships, not least with regard to the need for special 
measures for special partners.
In general, NATO has underinvested in the potential 
transformative strategic effect of partnerships. Coop-
erating with NATO has a double function for partners. 
The first function involves security policy and provides 
access to a multilateral forum, formal consultations and 
an informal extension of bilateral relations with power-
ful countries. The second function involves access to 
the NATO network. NATO is the global provider of best 
practices regarding defence and security policy. By coop-
erating with NATO, partners also have access to opera-
tive cooperation and the acquisition of NATO standards 
in the broadest sense, including instruction, training 
and exercises. Partnerships can therefore be a means 
of changing a given partner. Through cooperation and 
substantial investments in building up institutions and 
capacities, partnerships with NATO – with partner co-
ownership in conformity with sound development policy 
practice – can become a strategic tool for NATO.
NATO has developed a process (Membership Action 
Plan) that prepares countries for membership, but has 
found it difficult to create a process for countries that 
cannot become members. With regard to Georgia and 
Ukraine, NATO has thus had interests in and coop-
eration with them, but they have not been adequate 
enough for a Russian intervention to be considered 
to constitute a violation of the alliances in accordance 
with Article 5. Russia’s conduct similarly demonstrates 
that NATO’s borders have advanced so far to the east 
and that Russia’s policy has been so confrontational 
that admitting countries such as Georgia or, if it should 
once again become relevant, Ukraine, would involve 
considerable risk. These countries cannot live up to the 
central criterion for admission – that they would not 
bring security problems with them into NATO. Russia 
has made sure of this by creating insecurity with regard 
to their borders. On the other hand, Russia’s conduct 
demonstrates the cost of not admitting them. Security 
conditions in the countries on the other side of NATO’s 
borders are unclear and could lead to instability and cri-
sis. This presents NATO with a dilemma in line with the 
EU’s: how to manage risk in relations with the Eastern 
European countries that are not members.
Turkey and Syria · Turkey is a full member of NATO 
but this does not rule out the circumstance that the 
country constitutes a potential challenge for NATO 
that is far more concrete that the challenge for the EU 
in the same connection. One result of the confronta-
tion between the West and Russia after the Ukraine 
Crisis could very well be a complete breakdown of the 
fragile cooperation on the civil war in Syria. Obama 
justified his refusal to intervene in Syria on the grounds 
that he could collaborate with Russia to remove the 
country’s chemical weapons and negotiate a solution 
in the longer term. Negotiations now appear even less 
realistic than they did before, and the United States 
stopped collaborating with Russia on the destruction of 
the chemical weapons. The result was that the US and 
the West now really have no influence on the conflict, 
while Russia’s influence is increasing. At the same time, 
Syria is an area that allows Russia to show the West the 
consequences of introducing sanctions. An escalation of 
the civil war in Syria is therefore highly possible and this 
escalation could draw Turkey into the fray. If the conflict 
in Syria – through the agency of Russia – came to in-
volve Turkey, Turkey could invoke Article 5, which would 
bring NATO into the conflict. There is therefore a risk of 
a proxy war between the West and Russia in Syria.
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Conventional deterrence · Conventional deterrence 
has again become current for NATO due to Russia’s use 
of conventional power in Ukraine and the pattern of 
Russia’s actions in its neighbouring countries outside 
NATO’s area. Deterrence is the effect produced by a 
country’s military forces. The potential threat of the use 
of power reflected by the armed forces changes the 
calculation that a potential opponent’s actions are based 
on. In other words, defence is an insurance mechanism 
– a lock on the door. Deterrence has assumed two forms 
since the beginning of the 20th century: nuclear and 
conventional. NATO and Russia possess a mutual nu-
clear deterrent and, viewed alone, this nuclear deterrent 
creates a stable situation. However, the nuclear deter-
rent is an abstract entity that is detached from specific 
geographical circumstances.
After the end of the Cold War, the general view of 
nuclear weapons changed focus. From being a question 
of mutual deterrence between the two blocs in connec-
tion with the risk of a nuclear war, and thereby the risk 
of what would manifestly be mutual destruction, the 
new world order appears to a greater extent to follow 
an agenda on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 
to unstable states or terrorists.62 Iran’s atomic pro-
gramme in particular, since it became public knowledge 
in 2002, has been the object of a great deal of debate 
and has led to comprehensive sanctions.63 In spite of the 
end of the Cold War, however, and the change of focus, 
the nuclear threat is still present and NATO has there-
fore not rejected the option of a nuclear defence. 
NATO expressed a wish in the strategic concept at 
the Lisbon summit for a world without nuclear weap-
ons, but made it clear at the same time that as long as 
nuclear weapons existed, NATO would be an alliance 
with nuclear capacities for the purpose of defence and 
deterrence via the nuclear powers the United States, 
Great Britain and France64. The president of the latter 
country, François Hollande, also emphasised at the Chi-
cago summit in 2012 that a possible missile defence sys-
tem under the auspices of NATO could complement the 
nuclear deterrent – but could not replace nuclear weap-
ons.65 This was a clear signal from NATO that there was 
both the ability and, in the appropriate circumstances, 
the will to counter the worst conceivable threat – the 
use of nuclear weapons – by using nuclear weapons in 
order to deter an opponent from using its own nuclear 
weapons. Furthermore, a missile defence system could 
help to reduce the effect of an attack on NATO with 
nuclear missiles whereby the effect of NATO’s deterrent 
would be increased – as the message from NATO would 
be: we can hit you, but you can’t hit us.
The conventional deterrent is far more bound up 
with time and space than the nuclear deterrent. The 
immediate, concrete ability to bring armed forces into 
action is decisive for a credible conventional deterrent, 
which depends on deployments and similar measures, 
which nuclear missile systems have made superfluous. 
There is therefore a great difference between having an 
aircraft carrier in the Pacific and having one in the Baltic. 
A comparison between Russia’s defence budget and 
NATO’s, or simply between that of the European NATO 
countries, shows that Russia’s is far smaller. However, 
a comparison between the Russia defence budget 
and that of the three Baltic States shows that Russian 
expenditure and actual military capacities are far and 
away greater than those of the Baltic States. A compari-
son of the size and capacities of the Western forces and 
those of Russia shows that the West is correspondingly 
superior, but the calculation looks very different again 
if the Russian forces in the Western military district are 
compared with NATO’s forces in the Baltic. In order to 
work, conventional deterrence must be based on the 
practical possibility of countering a concrete attack in a 
concrete place (or at least on the possibility of relieving 
those who are under attack in a convincing manner). 
Deterrence must not only be convincing to a potential 
opponent, it must also serve as a guarantee for an 
anxious NATO member. When analysing NATO’s actions 
in connection with the Ukraine Crisis, it is worth dif-
ferentiating between deployments that serve to reduce 
anxiety in the eastern member countries, and plans and 
deployments that really have a deterrent effect. 
Considerations about conventional deterrence take 
on a new character if the aim is to deter Russia from 
waging what is known as special war where Russia, as 
it has done in Ukraine, exploits national minorities to 
create instability and contest borders. NATO’s doctrines 
of deterrence are based on deterring a military attack 
and are therefore in danger of being bypassed because 
Russia can so to speak sneak an intervention in because 
it is beneath the limits of what NATO can be expected 
to intervene for. The Ukraine Crisis therefore makes a 
demand for the development of NATO’s concepts for 
conventional deterrence.
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Missile defence systems · Missile defence systems 
have been on NATO’s agenda for many years and the 
US has already installed such defence systems in Poland 
and Romania that protect parts of NATO against a 
missile attack. Unlike the Star Wars Programme of the 
1980s, NATO’s plans for a missile defence system are 
not intended for defence against an attack by a major 
power with many missiles, but against an attack from a 
smaller state, such as Iran, with a few missiles. Never-
theless, every defence system will reduce a potential op-
ponent’s ability to hit the target and not least the ability 
to conduct a limited nuclear war. Russia has therefore 
taken the view of NATO’s plans for a missile shield that 
it is a way of disturbing the nuclear balance which is, in 
a sense, in its place as it was during the Cold War era. 
NATO has answered that now, when the Cold War has 
ended, it was difficult to understand Russia’s problem 
as NATO has no plans to attack Russia and, according 
to NATO, Russia can hardly feel it is under threat from 
a system that was designed to counter a threat from 
Iran and similar states. The discussion has not been very 
constructive and has basically involved different views of 
what the European security system is all about. 
After the war in Afghanistan, a missile defence 
system was an obvious area to invest in because it dem-
onstrated that NATO countries had common goals and 
could operate systems together. Therefore, there has 
been talk of supplementing the land-based systems with 
a marine-based system to enable five to ten warships to 
protect the rest of NATO. The most cogent argument 
against this investment so far has been that it would 
strain relations with Russia. Today, Russia’s reaction is 
the most cogent argument in favour of the investment. 
A missile defence system would send Russia a clear 
signal to the effect that the Kremlin cannot veto it, but 
at the same time it would be a defensive system that 
would be a far less aggressive reaction than deploying 
NATO’s response force (NRF) in the Baltic. Furthermore, 
a missile defence system involves expensive, advanced 
equipment of the kind that the Kremlin (especially in the 
light of sanctions) could hardly afford. It would be a not 
particularly subtle reminder that NATO is militarily supe-
rior to Russia. Finally, a missile defence system would be 
an obvious point of departure for cooperation between 
US and European fleets. Cooperation on a missile 
defence system could also become even more important 
because a consequence of the Ukraine Crisis might be 
that Russia would no longer help to freeze Iran’s nuclear 
programme. Even though Russia would only give Iran 
the green light for a nuclear arms build-up with a cer-
tain amount of trepidation, Iran, like Syria, would be an 
effective way of increasing the West’s costs in connec-
tion with the sanctions against Russia and make it more 
difficult for the West to concentrate on Russia. 
interoperability and training · NATO’s credibility de-
pends on the ability of the member countries to cooper-
ate. Operations in Afghanistan have provided practical 
experience in the field which was not the case during 
the Cold War, and which in many ways has to a much 
greater extent geared NATO and a number of mem-
ber countries for concrete military cooperation. More 
specifically, a number of the smaller NATO states today 
have become accustomed to being at war, whereas until 
the 1990s this was a competence possessed only by 
bigger states such as the US, Great Britain and France. 
NATO’s ambition has been to maintain this with the help 
of military exercises, for instance, during the periods 
after operations in Afghanistan. The Ukraine Crisis has 
made this need even more concrete. 
NATO’s ability to support the defence of allies in the 
event of a war or a crisis would be a central question at 
a time when the Baltic States, for instance, have good 
grounds to ask whether they are on the list of countries 
with Russian minorities that want to be liberated. Dur-
ing the Cold War, NATO’s demonstrated its ability and 
will to relieve front line states such as Denmark through 
military exercises. The experience from these exercises 
helped to define NATO’s requirements for the individual 
country’s forces. The ability to operate together in the 
eastern part of NATO will probably play a far more 
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prominent role in the future. This also means that NATO 
will change the emphasis on operations outside its 
area to operations inside its own area. Whereas NATO’s 
planning hitherto has taken its point of departure in a 
number of scenarios in which the defence of member 
countries was important, but not the most probable of 
them, the defence scenario will now be given greater 
weight and therefore be allocated more resources. 
The consequence of this could well be that NATO will 
not give such high priority to capacity building, etc. 
However, the challenge would still be that the scenarios 
are all probable to a certain extent and that NATO can 
therefore not simply go back to a cold war structure. 
On the contrary, the new Russian challenge requires a 
completely different flexibility than did circumstances 
during the Cold War. 
Joint operations and joint capabilities · At a time 
of declining defence budgets, the best way to maintain 
capabilities has been to cooperate. This was the mes-
sage in Fogh Rasmussen’s idea of Smart Defence, and 
this message will under any circumstances be central 
to NATO’s Cardiff summit and in the future. However, 
in this area too, the Ukraine Crisis has made abstract 
ideas more concrete. The airspaces of the Baltic States 
have been protected by a joint NATO operation since 
2004. After the intervention in Crimea, this protection 
was strengthened by French aircraft, among others, and 
the United States sent planes to Poland. The purpose of 
this was not only to give the air forces in the Baltic more 
punch, it was also a classic NATO operation where as 
many members as possible moved their forces into the 
danger zone so that an attack would really be an attack 
on all (or certainly many) members. This is the declara-
tion of solidarity that is intended to demonstrate that the 
musketeer oath is meant to be taken seriously. This was 
underlined by NATO at the meeting of foreign ministers 
on 1 April 2014 where NATO’s focus on deployment and 
exercises was also emphasised.66 However, the discussions 
at the meeting also showed that there was a limit to how 
far a number of NATO countries were prepared to go. 
Poland’s request for the deployment of two brigades in its 
territory67 was rejected at the meeting and even though 
NATO has subsequently made much of demonstrating 
that the alliance’s crisis management and mobilisation 
mechanisms are fully functioning, the Ukraine Crisis will 
lead to a discussion as to precisely what the Western al-
lies can do to defend its eastern allies, who will probably 
want permanent staffs, bases and forces in their coun-
tries. Joint operations would therefore take on a new po-
litical significance that would go beyond the shopkeeper’s 
accounts of the Smart Defence, but which precisely 
therefore could breathe new life into cooperative projects 
and the joint purchasing of equipment, etc.
in Sum: Ukraine is not an isolated problem
For the EU, the Ukraine Crisis demonstrates the 
problems with the Union’s view of itself and the policy 
regarding its neighbours and Russia that followed from 
it. Where NATO is concerned, the Ukraine Crisis once 
again gives occasion to focus on regional security and 
on conventional deterrence. NATO and the EU must 
carefully consider which spoken and tacit guarantees 
they offer their partners. 
Nor is the Ukraine Crisis isolated in the sense that we 
can learn from previous crises and the way they have 
challenged European and allied policies and in this way 
equip ourselves for future debates and initiatives. We 
can learn that the interpretation of Russia’s motives and 
the role that concrete events, such as the Ukraine Crisis, 
will be central points in the debate. The various views 
that come to expression in that debate will presumably 
draw equally long dividing lines internally in the Euro-
pean countries, between the European governments and 
between the European governments and the US govern-
ment. This will bring various problems connected with 
Russia into play. The refocusing of NATO and the debate 
about this will not be least important for the Baltic and 
Scandinavian countries. They have followed NATO away 
from its neighbouring area to remote regions such as Iraq 
and Afghanistan and stationed defence forces there as a 
replacement for the territorial defence of the Cold War in 
the assumption that Russia was a risk that NATO and the 
European security system had under control. The events 
in Ukraine are a challenge to NATO with regard to this 
premise and a challenge to  Western strategy.
33
34
A Western strategy:    commitment and deterrence 
If Putin wanted to be taken seriously, he succeeded. 
Russia has attempted to thwart the West’s policies 
in a number of areas since the end of the Cold War. 
However, Russian attempts to put a spoke in the wheel 
of these policies at global level and to assert Russia at 
regional level were regarded as specific problems. Rus-
sia opposed the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and invaded 
Georgia in 2008, but these were regarded as isolated 
problems rather than expressions of general Russian 
revanchism. After the Ukraine Crisis it is clear that the 
Russian Government actually meant what it said and 
that Russian citizens actually back up this policy. Russia 
has got its second wind after the political, economic and 
social blow constituted by the breakdown of the Soviet 
empire. The end of the Cold War was not seen as a 
victory over communism that the West and Russia could 
join hands on, but as a Russian defeat that amputated 
parts of the Russian body. While the West has insisted 
that Russia in the long term would have to realise that 
the country had the same interests as the West, it must 
by now be clear that this is no longer the case. This has 
had decisive consequences for the West’s conditions for 
conducting security policy: 
•	 The	West	no	longer	has	the	initiative.
•	 Russia	has	the	will	and	the	ability	to	use	armed	force.
•	 This	is	a	question	of	competition	between	two	differ-
ent orders.
•	 Security	policy	has	precedence	once	again.
The West no longer has the initiative. 
Western policies (the enlargement of NATO and the EU, 
the intervention in the Balkans, supplying the forces in 
Afghanistan) have set the agenda for relations with Rus-
sia since the end of the Cold War – if for no other reason 
than that the West barely took Russia seriously unless the 
country protested about some aspect of Western policy. 
What Russia otherwise did in relations to its close neigh-
bours was not of strategic importance for the West. Rus-
sia constituted a risk in itself rather than a risk connected 
with concrete policies. However, with the Ukraine Crisis, 
Russia has shown that it can set the agenda and that the 
West’s preparedness to keep up is very poor.
Russia has the will and ability to use armed force. 
Armed force has not been part of the recipe for the way 
relations between West and East should be regulated 
since the end of the Cold War. On the contrary, Europe 
has been demilitarised, of which the dramatic limitation 
of defence budgets is an expression. Since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, armed force has only been used in Europe in 
the Balkans. This was a question of a conflict which the 
West intervened with the aim of preventing a war from 
shaping borders. The premise for European policy has 
been that international relations are based on trade and 
cooperation.
This is a question of competition between two dif-
ferent orders. 
Where the West was concerned, the end of the Cold 
War meant that Western ideas of an open society and a 
free market were the basis not only for the organisation 
of individual countries, but also for relations between 
them. The present Russian regime offers a different mod-
el – both to its own citizens and to the citizens of other 
countries. Russia is doing this within the framework of 
the global economy and in intensive trade with Europe.
Security policy has precedence once again. 
Precisely because Russia is integrated into the global 
economy in ways that the Soviet Union was not, it is an 
even bigger challenge for the Western countries, which 
traditionally see economy as a source of peaceful coex-
istence and integration, to understand that Russia uses 
its economic resources, especially in the energy sector, 
as an integral part of state power.
After the Ukraine Crisis the challenge for the West 
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A Western strategy:    commitment and deterrence 
will be to formulate a long-term, cohesive strategy 
based on the following principles: 
•	 Values	are	universal,	interests	are	not.
•	 Military	power	is	a	precondition	for	peace	in	Europe.	
•	 International	organisations	and	international	econo-
my are arenas, not forums for cooperation.
•	 Russia’s	vulnerability	must	be	exploited.
•	 The	Western	countries	must	stick	together.
Values are universal, interests are not. 
The West’s greatest assets are open societies and the 
free market. Neither in Europe nor in North America 
must we be misled by Putin’s state ideology to be-
lieve that Russians do not want an open, free society. 
The words spoken in the West must appeal to those 
Russians who want to take a different path, and the 
actions of the West must show that we are prepared to 
cooperate. Western citizens and governments, however, 
must at the same time arrive at the difficult conclusion 
that we simply do not share objectives with the Russian 
government. We do not agree about the foundation of 
state power, we do not agree about the role of the na-
tion in a global community and we do not agree about 
how international society should be organised.
Military power is a precondition for peace in  
Europe. 
Russia’s will and ability to use armed force emphasises 
that the security of European countries depends on 
a credible deterrent with regard to Russia. The West 
is overwhelmingly superior in relation to Russia when 
defence budgets and capacities are compared. However, 
the West cannot benefit from this superiority if Rus-
sia can play on the West’s hesitation to use its military 
capacities and on NATO’s inability to secure the defence 
of new members, especially the defence of the Baltic 
States. Credible deterrence is thus the key element in 
ensuring that the Putin government does not escalate 
the conflict with the West to the point where the West 
decides on military intervention.
international organisations and international econ-
omy are arenas, not forums for cooperation. 
These different values and conflicting interests mean that 
we must acknowledge that international cooperation 
and the global markets are not control-free spaces but 
arenas for a struggle about who gets his way. It is there-
fore means, not ends, that differ from the military sector.
Russia’s vulnerability must be exploited. 
Russia has taken the initiative because Putin’s govern-
ment has skilfully exploited the West’s sensitivity regard-
ing energy supplies combined with the West’s inability 
to realise that Russia will exploit that sensitivity and will 
not begin to act like a Western state over time by allow-
ing the market to function according to its own logic. 
No matter how sensitive to changes in Russian energy 
supplies a number of European countries may be in the 
short and medium term, European economies are far 
stronger than Russia’s. The West must invest its way out 
of dependency on Russia, whereas Russia will always be 
dependent on selling its energy products to the world’s 
biggest economic bloc. The West must formulate a 
long-term, cohesive energy and trade policy with regard 
to Russia that will enable the Western countries to 
exploit Russia’s vulnerability.
The Western countries must stick together. 
Putin has the initiative because the West has not priori-
tised the formulation of a cohesive policy. Western crisis 
management has been characterised by national initia-
tives that have been poorly coordinated in organisations 
with the result that Russia’s actions have not been met 
by a resolute response that would lead the Kremlin to 
expect concrete sanctions in the case of an escalation. 
In other words, the West has to a great extent created 
a sphere of action for Russia and it is decisive to reduce 
this sphere of action with the help of a coordinated 
Western policy. It is in the nature of the case that the 
precondition for this will be a compromise between the 
various attitudes and the recognition of the fact that 
Europe only has influence by virtue of close coopera-
tion with the United States. It is decisive for the West 
to establish a consensus on a new strategic concept for 
NATO, for instance, as it must coordinate many different 
attitudes and be prepared to react to Russian initiatives 
– just as the case was during the Cold War.
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